Dialectic
Apr 15th, 2005, 01:11 AM
The following is directly transcribed from Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality.
In "The evolution of consciousness? Transpersonal theories in light of cultural relativism," Michael Winkelman marshals the cultural relativist arguments against ranking any sort of consciousness achievement as higher or lower than another across cultures. No cultural position is or can be superior to another, he says; it has to be decided on its own merits, and on those alone: no position is intrinsically superior. He then proceeds to explain why his position is intrinsically superior.
Sensing a contradiction, he then exempts his own global-theorizing stance from having any adaptive value. He must do this, because if he admits that a worldcentric, global perspectivism has adaptive advantage over narrower perspectives, then he must admit that his cultural stance of universal-global perspectivism is superior to those cultures that he studies that do not share his universal pluralism.
Thus, Winkelman's performative contradiction shows up most obviously in the fact that he is convinced that his overall stance is superior to alternative and rival approaches, but his own thoery cannot state why this is so. Instead, he simply lashes out at those who profess any sort of ranking system (and he does so using his implicit ranking system).
...
If we acknowledge (with Winkelman) that universal perspectivism is better (in any sense of the word) than narrow ethnocentrism (and this is the true part of all cultural relativists' stance), and since this worldcentric perspectivism is not simply given to cultures at the start but develops and evolves slowly over the millennia, then we are justified in examining the developmental stages that lead to a capacity to take a worldcentric stance. This leads inexorably to theories of communication and the evolution of societies, and this is precisely the path that Habermas and others have taken.
In so doing, Habermas arrives at a series of universal validity claims that are cross-cultural and extra-linguistic, and open to fallibilist criteria. There is, so to speak, no other way to proceed if we want to actually acknowledge the moments of truth in cultural relativism, moments of truth that, if pursued sincerely (and not merely exempted from their own claims), lead inexorably to universalist validity claims.
...
Thus, universal and worldcentric pluralism is a very difficult, very rare, very special, very elite stance. In many ways I happen to agree with that elite stance. But I am not impressed when these elitists call it anti-elitist.
-- Wilber, Ken. Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality, 2nd ed. Notes for Pages 38-47. 2000, 554-56.
In "The evolution of consciousness? Transpersonal theories in light of cultural relativism," Michael Winkelman marshals the cultural relativist arguments against ranking any sort of consciousness achievement as higher or lower than another across cultures. No cultural position is or can be superior to another, he says; it has to be decided on its own merits, and on those alone: no position is intrinsically superior. He then proceeds to explain why his position is intrinsically superior.
Sensing a contradiction, he then exempts his own global-theorizing stance from having any adaptive value. He must do this, because if he admits that a worldcentric, global perspectivism has adaptive advantage over narrower perspectives, then he must admit that his cultural stance of universal-global perspectivism is superior to those cultures that he studies that do not share his universal pluralism.
Thus, Winkelman's performative contradiction shows up most obviously in the fact that he is convinced that his overall stance is superior to alternative and rival approaches, but his own thoery cannot state why this is so. Instead, he simply lashes out at those who profess any sort of ranking system (and he does so using his implicit ranking system).
...
If we acknowledge (with Winkelman) that universal perspectivism is better (in any sense of the word) than narrow ethnocentrism (and this is the true part of all cultural relativists' stance), and since this worldcentric perspectivism is not simply given to cultures at the start but develops and evolves slowly over the millennia, then we are justified in examining the developmental stages that lead to a capacity to take a worldcentric stance. This leads inexorably to theories of communication and the evolution of societies, and this is precisely the path that Habermas and others have taken.
In so doing, Habermas arrives at a series of universal validity claims that are cross-cultural and extra-linguistic, and open to fallibilist criteria. There is, so to speak, no other way to proceed if we want to actually acknowledge the moments of truth in cultural relativism, moments of truth that, if pursued sincerely (and not merely exempted from their own claims), lead inexorably to universalist validity claims.
...
Thus, universal and worldcentric pluralism is a very difficult, very rare, very special, very elite stance. In many ways I happen to agree with that elite stance. But I am not impressed when these elitists call it anti-elitist.
-- Wilber, Ken. Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality, 2nd ed. Notes for Pages 38-47. 2000, 554-56.